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In this paper we conduct a counterfactual analysis and estimate the quantitative importance of 
demand and supply effects on wage inequality in Germany using a dynamic computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987) type. Specifically, the 
methodological contribution of our dynamic CGE model refers to the three-level constant 
elasticity of substitution production function and the endogenous labor supply of three 
different skill types, which enable us to isolate the impact of capital-skill complementarity 
(i.e., demand effects) and varying skill-specific labor supply (i.e., supply effects) on the 
evolution of the skill premia as defined by the 9th to 1st, the 9th to 5th, and the 5th to 1st 
decile limit of earnings. 
In short, our simulation results show that the complementarity effect has a particularly strong 
positive impact on the skill premium of the high-skilled, while the quantity effect counteracts 
the complementarity effect and exerts an alleviating pressure on the skill premium of the 
high-skilled. In quantitative terms, the complementarity effect raises the skill premium of the 
9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings by more than 1.0 and 0.8 percent per year, 
respectively. By contrast, the quantity effect reduces both above-mentioned skill premia by 
almost 0.3 and 0.45 percent per year, respectively. Even though the complementarity and the 
quantity effects work in opposite directions, the complementarity effect has a much stronger 
impact on the skill premia of the high-skilled compared with the quantity effect. 
JEL Code: J31, J23, C68. 
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After the slowdown of the German economy in 2001, the earnings dispersion, measured by the
ratio of the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings, increased substantially (Gernandt and Pfei⁄er,
2006). As reported by the OECD Employment Outlook 2007, the earnings dispersion over the
period from 1995 to 2005 increased by 12.2 percent in Germany but only by 5.9 percent in the
United States, or Sweden, and by less than 1 percent in the United Kingdom or France. Despite
this enormous hike in earnings inequality, Germany also faced a steady increase in the supply
of highly educated workers during the same period. Between 1991 and 2005 the number of
German citizens holding a university degree rose by more than 13 percent (Destatis 1994, 2006).
Therefore, Germany showed the same puzzling pattern of rising earnings inequality during a
period of substantial growth in the supply of high-skilled workers, as previously observed in the
United States and elsewhere1 (for example, see Bound and Johnson 1992, Katz and Murphy
1992, Krussel et al. 2000, or Lindquist 2005).2
We approach this puzzle and disentangle the quantitative importance of demand and supply
e⁄ects by applying a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model in the spirit of
Auerbach-Kotliko⁄ (1987). The CGE model is embedded in the framework of a neoclassical
growth model and features a three-level constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function with capital and three di⁄erent skill types of labor as input factors. Both the ￿rm￿ s
and the household￿ s behavior are forward-looking. The ￿rm￿ s optimal investment and skill-
speci￿c labor demand are derived from an intertemporal investment model while the household
maximizes its lifetime utility via an optimal intertemporal consumption path and optimal skill-
speci￿c labor supply.
The methodological innovation of our dynamic CGE model refers to the three-level CES
production function using capital, and low-, medium-, and high-skilled labor as input factors,
and to the endogenous labor supply of these three skill types. Given this set-up, the CGE
model enables us to isolate the quantitative importance of capital-skill complementarity and
varying skill-speci￿c labor supply on the evolution of the skill premia as de￿ned by the 9th
to 1st, the 9th to 5th, and the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings. This distinction between
the repercussions resulting from the complementarity e⁄ect (i.e., the demand e⁄ects) and the
quantity e⁄ect (i.e., the supply e⁄ects) constitutes an important contribution of our work to the
literature on wage inequality that has been largely neglected in the past. Furthermore, the CGE
model enables us to provide profound estimates for the substitution elasticities between capital
and the di⁄erent labor skill types, as done in the empirical studies, for instance, by Krussel et
al. (2000) or Lindquist (2005). In addition, we simultaneously derive adequate labor supply
elasticities for the di⁄erent skill groups under the presence of capital-skill complementarity that
1 The hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity was ￿rst formalized by Griliches (1969) and states that the
elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is higher than the one between capital and high-
skilled labor. A stronger version of this hypothesis even predicts that capital and unskilled labor are substitutes
in production while capital and high-skilled labor are complements. As a consequence of this hypothesis, the skill
premium tends to increase whenever capital is accumulated. Contrary to that, the steady increase in the relative
supply of skilled vis-￿-vis unskilled labor should have an alleviating impact on the skill premium and thus on
wage inequality. The rationale refers to the cost advantage of skilled vis-￿-vis unskilled labor, if the former is
more elastically supplied compared with the latter.
2 The capital-skill complementarity hypothesis has been the subject of numerous empirical studies such as,
for example, Griliches (1969), Fallon and Layard (1975), Bound and Johnson (1992), Goldin and Katz (1998),
or Lindquist (2005). For cross-country evidence see Machin and Van Reenen (1998), Du⁄y et al. (2003), or
Papageorgiou and Chmelarova (2005).
1are consistent with the actual pattern in German skill premia and skill-speci￿c labor supply in
Germany. Finally, the fact that we also account for medium-skilled labor in addition to low-
and high-skilled labor is another important feature that separates our work from the existing
papers in this strand of the literature.3 The group of medium-skilled workers is, however, of
particular importance when analyzing wage inequality (in Germany), since medium-skilled labor
often accounts for the largest share of the total labor force (about 58 percent in Germany), while
low- and high-skilled workers are much less important in quantitative terms (they account for
about 15 and 27 percent of the labor force, respectively, in Germany). Hence, the aggregation of
medium-skilled labor together with either low- or high-skilled labor creates major inconsistencies
and biased estimates, which are not consistent with the empirical data on macro aggregates.
Our simulation results con￿rm our conjecture and show that the complementarity e⁄ect
has a particularly strong positive impact on the skill premium of the high-skilled, while the
quantity e⁄ect counteracts the complementarity e⁄ect and exerts an alleviating pressure on the
skill premium of the high-skilled. In quantitative terms, the complementarity e⁄ect raises the
skill premium of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings by more than 1.0 and
0.8 percent per year, respectively. The quantity e⁄ect, on the other hand, reduces both above-
mentioned skill premia by almost 0.3 and 0.45 percent per year, respectively. With regard to
the skill premium de￿ned by the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings, the complementarity and
the quantity e⁄ects are not antagonists, but work in the same direction. The complementarity
e⁄ect causes a yearly increase of 0.22 percent in the skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit
of earnings while the quantity e⁄ect causes an increase of 0.18 percent per year. Moreover, we
￿nd that the less elastic the labor supply elasticities are, the larger the impact of capital-skill
complementarity on skill premia.
Even though the complementarity and the quantity e⁄ects work in general in the opposite
direction, the complementarity e⁄ect has a much stronger ￿about 2.5 times larger ￿impact on
skill premia of the high-skilled as compared with the impact of the quantity e⁄ect.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the theo-
retical setup of the dynamic CGE model and outlines the three-level CES production function
as well as the optimal labor supply of households. It additionally covers the calibration and
empirical implementation of the model. Section 3 presents the conducted simulations with re-
gard to the complementarity and the quantity e⁄ect as well as several sensitivity analyses, while
Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Setup and Calibration
In the spirit of Auerbach and Kotliko⁄ (1987) we develop a dynamic, two-country CGE model
based on neoclassical growth theory.4 The representative ￿rm￿ s optimal behavior is derived by an
intertemporal investment model with convex adjustment costs. The three-level CES production
function features capital-skill complementarity and uses low-, medium-, and high-skilled labor,
next to capital, as input factors. On the household side, a representative, in￿nitively lived
3 Nearly all papers in the existing literature distinguish only between low- and high-skilled labor but neglect
medium-skilled labor when explaining wage inequality. See, for instance, Bound and Johnson (1992), Du⁄y et al.
(2003), Goldin and Katz (1998), Krussel et al. (2000), Lindquist (2005), Papageorgiou and Chme- larova (2005),
or Topel (1997).
4A comprehensive model documentation is provided by Stimmelmayr (2007).
2individual maximizes his lifetime utility via an optimally chosen intertemporal consumption
path and optimal skill-speci￿c labor supply.
Our dynamic CGE model thus mimics the most important behavioral margins at the ￿rm and
household levels that in￿ uence the evolution of the skill premia measured by the 9th to 1st, the
9th to 5th, and the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings, respectively. Since capital accumulation and
labor supply are dynamic phenomena, the applied model is especially suitable for quantifying
the impact of economic growth on the skill premium under the presence of both capital-skill
complementarity and a varying relative supply of the di⁄erent labor skill types.5
One important limitation of our model is the fact that there is no scope for ￿involuntary￿
unemployment in general equilibrium since labor markets are assumed to be competitive and
no constraints are imposed on the behavior of ￿rms or workers.
Moreover, as frequently discussed, any increase in the skill premium provides an incentive
to invest in human capital. Even though the model does not explicitly feature the household￿ s
investment in human capital, we solve this shortcoming by applying di⁄erentiated supply elas-
ticities for the various skill types of labor.6
2.1 Production Technology
The representative ￿rm relies on a neoclassical, well-behaved, linearly homogenous three-level
CES production technology, Y = F(K;LL;LM;LH) with capital, K, low-skilled, LL, medium-
skilled, LM, and high-skilled labor, LH, as input factors
Y = F(K;LL;LM;LH) = FKK + FLLLL + FLMLM + FLHLH; (1)
with F(0) = 0; F0 > 0; F00 < 0:
The respective wage rates of each labor skill type are denoted by wi, with i 2 fL;M;Hg. The
price of the output good is normalized to unity. Investments, I, incur adjustment costs of size
J(I;K), which imply decreasing returns from capital accumulation.7 Accounting for total wage
costs,
P
wiLi, and depreciation of capital, ￿K, the pro￿ts of the representative ￿rm are given
by
￿ = Yt ￿ Jt ￿
X
wi;tLi;t ￿ ￿Kt. (2)
Capital-Skill Complementarity
The feature of capital-skill complementarity is embedded in the three-level CES production
function by the means of nested CES aggregates and varying elasticities of substitution on each
level. Our speci￿cation of the production function states





with ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3 representing CES aggregates. According to Griliches (1969), the feature of
capital-skill complementarity just requires the elasticity of substitution within the CES aggregate
5Compared with a simple steady-state analysis, our dynamic CGE model traces the economy￿ s complete phase
of transition from the initial to the ￿nal steady state.
6Additionally, we perform several sensitivity analyses with regard to the applied labor supply elasticities that
enable us to map the pattern in labor supply of the di⁄erent skill types as reported in the German data.
7The adjustment cost function, J(I;K) is linearly homogeneous in investments, I, and capital, K, and convex
in investments, JI and JII > 0. Moreover, steady-state adjustment costs are zero.
3￿3 to be the smallest, but it imposes no further restrictions on the absolute or relative size of
the substitution elasticity between medium-skilled labor and the capital-skill input, ￿3(K;LH),
or the one between low-skilled labor and the intermediate input, ￿2(LM;￿3).8
The reader might wonder why we apply a three-level CES production function in our CGE
model while mostly two-level CES functions are applied in the (empirical) literature. If we rely on
a simple two-level production technology, we would have to include medium-skilled labor either
together with low-skilled labor or together with high-skilled labor in one nest. Such a modeling
approach, however, is not consistent with the empirical data on German macro aggregates and
would thus reduce our model￿ s ￿t substantially. This problem arises because medium-skilled
labor constitutes the lion￿ s share of total labor supply in the German economy, and accordingly,
lumping the quantitatively important magnitude of medium-skilled labor together with low- or
high-skilled labor, respectively, causes substantial inconsistencies. Moreover, under a two-level
production technology we are not able to track the evolution of the skill premia of the 9th to
5th and the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings because changes in factor demands reveal to be
proportional within each nest.































with ￿i = (1 ￿ ￿i) and i 2 fL;M;Hg. The variable ￿i governs the distribution parameter
of the production function and the variable A denotes neutral technological change while the
variable ￿i with i 2 fL;M;Hg denotes the substitution parameter between the input factors.
The respective substitution elasticities are de￿ned by ￿i = 1=(1 + ￿i) with i 2 fL;M;Hg9. As
discussed above, the feature of capital-skill complementarity just requires ￿H to be the smallest
elasticity within the production function but places no further restriction on the substitution
elasticities.10
In the case where we abstract from capital-skill complementarity we set all substitution
elasticities to one in our simulations.
8Another way of modeling capital-skill complementarity using a three-level CES function is to place low-







. Such a speci￿cation,
however, requires an identical substitution elasticity between high-skilled labor and capital, and high-skilled labor
and low-skilled labor, which, according to Hammermesh￿ s 1993 ￿ndings, is not true.
9Speci￿cally, the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled labor and capital is given by ￿H, the one
between medium-skilled labor and the capital-kill input by ￿M and ￿nally the one between low-skilled labor and
the intermediate input by ￿L.
10In case low-skilled labor and capital are assumed to be substitutes while high-skilled labor and capital are
complements, the substitution elasticities and substitution parameters have the following properties: ￿L > 1 with
1 < ￿L < 1 and ￿H < 1 with ￿1 < ￿H < 0:
4Firm Value and Optimal Firm Behavior
The ￿rm value, Vt, is determined by the present value of all future payouts, ￿, which are













with ￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)[Yt ￿ Jt ￿
P
wi;tLi;t ￿ ￿Kt] ￿ It:
(5)
The variable G represents the steady-state growth factor, 1+g, and the discount rate rV denotes










s.t. GKt+1 = It + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt;
(6)
and yields the following ￿rst-order conditions:
(a) Li : FLi;t = wi
t;








Following (7a), the optimal labor demand for each skill type is determined by the point of equality
between the marginal product of the respective labor skill type, FLi, and its corresponding wage
rate, wi.
Optimal investment behavior, as speci￿ed in (7b), requires that the shadow price of capital,
qe
t+1, equals the incurred cost of an additional investment. The latter includes acquisition and
adjustment costs.
2.2 Household Side and Labor Supply
The household sector is modeled in the spirit of an in￿nitely lived, representative agent whose
maximization problem involves the optimal intertemporal choice of consumption, C, and the
optimal individual labor supply of each skill category li; i 2 fL; M; Hg. The rate of time
preference, ￿, determines the weight the household assigns to future consumption. Additionally,
labor supply involves some disutility of work of size ’(li). Starting with these ingredients the
household￿ s maximization problem states
U (At) = max













s.t. GAt+1 = (1 + rV
t )At +
P3
i [wt;iLt;i] ￿ Ct:
(8)
The total wealth of the representative household consists of his capital endowment, A, his capital
income, rV A, earned on corporate equity, and the sum of labor income,
P3
i [wt;iLt;i], earned by
each skill type of labor supplied. The optimal labor supply of each respective skill type requires
the marginal disutility from labor supply to equal the compensation payment received via wages
’0 (li) = wi: (9)
5Applying a speci￿c functional form for the disutility of work that is contingent on the respective
labor supply elasticity, "i, and a scaling parameter, ￿, the individual labor supply of each skill
category reads11
’(li) = ￿￿1="i l1+1="i
1+1="i => li;t = ￿ [wi]
"i . (10)







; with Qt = Ct ￿
P 3
i ’(li;t); (11)
which speci￿es the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption.
2.3 Empirical Implementation of the CGE Model
The computational procedure of any numeric CGE model requires the speci￿cation of functional
forms and the choice of appropriate behavioral parameters and elasticities from the empirical
literature. In this context, the calibration implies that the model￿ s initial steady state replicates
the stationary long-run macroeconomic equilibrium of the considered economy.12 All behavioral
parameters applied in our model are standard results in line with the empirical literature. The
most important behavioral parameters applied are summarized in Table 1.
The real annual growth rate of the German economy is assumed to be 1.1 percent, which is,
according to Bandholz et al. (2005), a fair estimate for Germany after reuni￿cation. Economic
depreciation is set to 5 percent of the capital stock.
The adjustment speed towards the new steady state is determined by the half-life of invest-
ment. As in the study of Cummins et al. (1996), we take a value of 8.0, which implies that
during the following eight years after a shock half of the long-run increase in the capital stock
is accumulated.13
Table 1: Behavioral Parameter Values Applied
Annual German Growth Rate (Bandholz et al., 2005) 0.011
Half-life of Capital Accumulation (Cummins et al., 1996) 8.0
Elasticity of Substitution between
high-skilled labor and capital (Lindquist, 2005) 0.51
medium-skilled labor and capital-skill input 1.33
low-skilled labor and intermediate input 2.1
Compensated labor Supply Elasticity
low-, medium-, high-skilled 0.89 / 0.25 / 0.8
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (Flaig 1988) 0.40
One of the key parameters describing the production side of the economy is the elasticity
of substitution between capital and the di⁄erent skill types of labor. Most estimates for the
11Aggregate labor supply of each skill category, L
S
i , is achieved via aggregation: L
S
i;t = li;t￿Nt, where N denotes
the size of the labor force in the economy.
12Even though hardly any model is in the position to replicate a country￿ s macroeconomic aggregates as detailed
as depicted in the national accounts, each model should at least re￿ ect the stylized facts of the considered economy.
13Accordingly, we set the parameter specifying adjustment costs equal to 2. A similar value is also applied by
Valkonen (1999) and represents a lower end value of available estimates (see Whited, 1994).
6substitution elasticity between capital and labor range between 0 and 1, depending on the
underlying estimation technique. The study by Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999), for instance,
suggests an elasticity of 0.25 using panel data, whereas a higher value of 0.7 is calculated by
Jorgenson and Yun (2001).
Those studies that estimate substitution elasticities in the presence of capital-skill comple-
mentarity, such as that by Krussel et al. (2000) or Lindquist (2005), ￿nd substantially larger
substitution elasticities between low-skilled labor and capital, ranging between 1.4 and 1.7, but
much smaller ones in the size of 0.5 to 0.7 between high-skilled labor and capital.14 To replicate
the pattern of the German skill premium of the 9th to 5th, the 9th to 1st, and the 5th to 1st
decile limit of earnings during the period from 1991 to 2005, we apply a value of 0.51 for the
substitution elasticity between high-skilled labor and capital. This number is quite close to the
estimate by Lindquist, who suggests a substitution elasticity of 0.52 between high-skilled labor
and capital for the Swedish economy.15
For the substitution elasticity between medium-skilled labor and the capital-skill input and
that between low-skilled labor and the intermediate input, we apply values of 1.33 and 2.1,
respectively. The last ￿gure, in particular, seems to be substantially larger compared with the
substitution elasticities between low-skilled labor and capital of 1.4 or 1.67 found by Lindquist or
Krussel et al., respectively. When comparing these numbers one has, however, to consider that
neither the study by Lindquist nor by Krussel et al. distinguishes between low- and medium-
skilled labor. If we take low- and medium-skilled labor together and compute the weighted
average of the joint substitution elasticity between the low- and medium-skilled labor aggregate
and capital, we come up with a value of 1.48, which is between the estimate of 1.4 and 1.7
proposed by Lindquist and Krussel et al., respectively.16;17
Turning to the behavioral parameters for skill-speci￿c labor supply, we ￿nd a multitude of
studies dealing with labor supply elasticities of German households, but the empirical evidence on
skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities for German workers is rather scarce. Fehr (1999) provides
some simulation results for compensated labor supply elasticities for the lowest, the third, and
the top quintile of earnings. These data are, however, not appropriate to replicate the observed
pattern in the skill-speci￿c German labor supply during the analyzed period from 1991 to 2005.
Therefore, we take Fehr￿ s (1999) estimates just as a starting point and adjust the skill-speci￿c
labor supply elasticities in a stepwise process by trial and error in order to exactly replicate the
actual pattern in the German skill premia and skill-speci￿c German labor supply.18 After this
calibration procedure we come up with a labor supply elasticity of 0.89 for low-skilled labor,
0.25 for medium-skilled labor, and 0.8 for high-skilled labor. On average, these ￿gures propose a
14Since all of the empirical studies that estimate substitution elasticities in the presence of capital-skill com-
plementarity apply just a two-level production technology we miss an empirically founded estimate for the sub-
stitution elasticity between medium-skilled labor and capital.
15Krussel et al. (2000) suggest a slightly larger substitution elasticity of 0.67 between high-skilled labor and
capital using US data.
16If we take low- and medium-skilled labor together, low-skilled labor accounts for about 20 percent of this
joint labor aggregate. Accordingly the weighted average of the joint substitution elasticity between low- and
medium-skilled labor and capital is given by: 0:2 ￿ 2:1 + 0:8 ￿ 1:33 = 1:48:
17The empirical evidence for the German economy by FitzRoy and Funke (1995) deviates quite signi￿cantly
from the above numbers. They ￿nd a much lower elasticity of substitution of only 0.50 between low-skilled labor
and capital and one of 0.21 between high-skilled labor and capital using data on 32 West German manufacturing
industries during the period 1975-1995.
1818For a more detailed discussion on the calibration strategy for substitution and labor supply elasticities see
the subsection ￿Simulation Strategy and Replication Check.￿
7weighted, economy-wide labor supply elasticity of about 0.5.19 Surprisingly, this ￿gure is almost
identical to the value of 0.51, which Feldstein (2005) proposes as an applicable estimate for the
average compensated labor supply elasticity in macro models.
Finally, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 0.4. This value is based on
Flaig￿ s (1988) empirical research for Germany, and is slightly lower than the values applied by
Keuschnigg and Dietz (2004) in their study for Switzerland or the one by Valkonen (1999).
Macroeconomic Data
Given the speci￿cation of the behavioral parameters as described in the previous section, our
dynamic CGE model is able to replicate the most important economic variables of the German
economy quite closely. Table 2 reports the main German macroeconomic aggregates for 2005,
the 5-year averages, and the aggregates replicated by our CGE model.20
GDP and private consumption expenditures are set exogenously in the calibration while all
other variables are determined endogenously by our model when computing the steady-state
equilibrium. In the phase of transition all variables adjust endogenously after a policy shock. If
we compare the 5-year averages of the macro aggregates with those replicated by our model, we
come up with a quite good ￿t. None of the macro aggregates replicated by the model exceeds
the 5-year averages by much.






GDP 2244.6 2312.7 2244.6*
Private Consumption 1326.4 1330.1 1326.4*
Compensation of Employees 1131.0 1146.7 1145.9
Capital Stock 6771.4 6776.4 6776.1
Depreciation 335.6 334.2 338.8
Gross Capital Formation 387.3 398.4 406.6
Note: Variables marked with a * are set exogenously to replicate the initial steady-state of the German economy.
Source: Destatis (2005), own calculation.
The actual development of the German capital stock, the skill distribution of the German
population and the German labor force, as well as the evolution of the German skill premia
measured by the 9th to 1st, the 9th to 5th, and the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings, respectively,
are presented in Table 3.
The data on the German capital stock are taken from a quite recent publication of the
German statistical o¢ ce (Destatis 2006a), which follows the de￿nition of the OECD manual
on Measuring Capital. As reported, the overall German capital stock increased from 8.194 bn.
Euros in 1991 to 11.162 bn. Euros in 2005, mapping an overall growth performance of 36.2
percent.21
19While low-skilled labor accounts for 14.7 percent of total labor supply in Germany, medium-skilled labor
accounts for 57.8 percent and high-skilled labor for the remaining 27.5 percent. Accordingly, the weighted,
economy-wide labor supply elasticity is computed by: 0:147 ￿ 0:89 + 0:578 ￿ 0:25 + 0:275 ￿ 0:8 = 0:495:
20The medium-run average is computed over the period from 2003 to 2007.
21In terms of capital endowment per worker, the capital intensity increased form 212,000 Euros in 1991 to
288,000 Euros in 2005, or by 38.8 percent.
8When tracing the evolution in the skill distribution of German workers, we rely on data from
the German micro census (Destatis 1994, 2006) that contain information on German employees
sorted by age and educational attainment.22 The group of low-skilled individuals are de￿ned as
those with no vocational training while the group of medium-skilled workers are those employees
who successfully completed an apprenticeship. To qualify as high-skilled, an individual either
completed technical college or holds a university degree.
As reported in Table 3, the number of people in the German labor force (LF) with no
vocational training declined slightly by 0.7 percent from 1991 to 2005. Next, the share of
workers who had served an apprenticeship declined by 3.3 percent during the analyzed period
while the fraction of people holding a university diploma increased by 8.3 percent.23
Table 3: Labor Force, Capital Stock and Skill Premia in Germany
1991 2005 %-age Change
total3) pW4) total pW pW total
Capital Stock 8,194 212 11,162 288 38.8 36.2
Skill Types (in %) TP1) LF2) TP LF TP LF
Low 19.8 14.8 18.4 14.7 -7.1 -0.7
Medium 58.4 59.8 57.0 57.8 -2.4 -3.3
High 21.8 25.4 24.7 27.5 13.3 8.3
Skill Premia 1991 3Y-Av.5) 2005 3Y-Av. 091 ￿0 05 3Y-Av.
D9/D1 2.83 2.78 3.13 3.12 10.7 12.2
D9/D5 1.71 1.71 1.84 1.81 7.5 5.8
D5/D1 1.65 1.63 1.70 1.73 2.8 6.1
1) total population; 2) labor force; 3) in Bn. e; 4) per worker in e1000; 5) 3-year average.
Source: OECD database on Earnings Dispersion; Destatis (1994, 2006, 2006a).
The data on the three di⁄erent skill premia are taken from the OECD database on Earnings
Distribution,24 and cover gross monthly earnings of German full-time workers for each decile
limit of earnings. The time series on Earnings Distribution provides yearly data from 1984 to
2006 such that it enables us to compute the change in the di⁄erent skill premia by taking yearly
￿gures for 1991 and 2005 as well as 3-year averages around 1991 and 2005. The latter turns
out to be of particular importance since the yearly ￿gures may be substantially distorted due
to in￿ ation or price shocks. If we rely solely on the changes between 1991 and 2005 the data
indicate an increase of 7.5 percent in the skill premium of the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings.
Taking the 3-year averages, however, the change in the corresponding skill premium amounts
to only 5.8 percent. Similarly, taking the yearly ￿gures for 1991 and 2005, the change in the
skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings amounts to just 2.8 percent, which is
substantially lower than the average earnings dispersion of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings
which amounted to 6.1 percent. Finally, the change in the skill premium of the 9th to 1st decile
22To exclude those employees who are still in the process of education, we restrict our calculations to the
German population ages 25 to 65.
23In terms of working population, the number of people with no education or a completed apprenticeship
declined by 7.1 and 2.4 percent, respectively, while the number of university graduates increased by 13.3 percent
during the analyzed period.
24The OECD database itself refers to the German Socio-Economic Panel as the underlying data base.
9limit of earnings amounted on average to 12.2 percent. Thus, it is slightly higher than the change
indicated by the ￿gures for 1991 and 2005.
Simulation Strategy, Replication Check and Solution Strategy
After the speci￿cation of all functional forms and behavioral parameters, our dynamic CGE
model is able to replicate the stationary long-run equilibrium of the 2005 German economy. To
quantify the evolution in the respective skill premia and skill distribution over the period from
1991 to 2005 we consider the following strategy: We disturb the initial steady-state equilibrium
by reducing the capital stock by exactly that amount by which the capital stock actually in-
creased between 1991 and 2005. By doing so, the model computes the whole phase of transition
from the initial to the ￿nal steady state and thereby replicates the phase of capital accumulation
as well as the resulting time paths for each wage rate, e.g. skill premia, within the analyzed
period.25
Replication Check: Before we start the simulation analysis it is advisable to check whether
the time paths reproduced by our dynamic CGE model are consistent with the actual develop-
ment of the respective German macro aggregates. If we stick to the estimates for the substitution
and labor supply elasticities found in the empirical literature, the simulated time path deviates
signi￿cantly from the actual pattern in the skill premia and the actual changes in skill-speci￿c la-
bor supply. Therefore, we alter the di⁄erent elasticities in a stepwise process in order to improve
the quality of our model￿ s ￿t when replicating actual German data.
Table 4: Actual and Replicated Data
Actual Data Rep. 1 Rep. 2 Rep. 3 Rep. 4
Substitution Elasticities: ￿L=￿M=￿H 1.67/1.00/0.67 2.32/1.00/0.60 1.67/1.00/0.67 2.1/1.33/0.51
Supply Elasticities:."L="M="H 0.49/0.54/059 0.49/0.54/059 0.6/0.14/1.2 0.89/0.25/0.8
￿ Skill Premia during the Period 1991 - 2005 (in %)
D9/D1 12.2 8.24 12.2 3.11 12.2
D9/D5 5.8 4.25 5.66 -5.28 5.79
D5/D1 6.1 3.83 6.16 8.85 6.07
￿ Skill Distribution during the Period 1991 - 2005 (in %)
Low -0.7 -2.90 -4.01 -0.73 -0.72
Medium -3.3 -0.47 -0.52 -3.34 -3.32
High 8.3 2.66 3.44 8.29 8.24
Source: Own calculations.
Table 4 reports the impact of a variation of the substitution elasticities, ￿i, and supply
elasticities, "i, i 2 fL;M;Hg, on the various skill premia and skill distribution. The ￿rst
column in Table 4 repeats the actual development in the German skill premia and German
skill distribution while the second column (Rep. 1) presents our simulation results when we
calibrate our model using the empirical data on the substitution and labor supply elasticities
provided by Krussel et al. (2000) and Fehr (1999). It becomes obvious that the skill premia
as predicted by our model are too small as compared with the actual development in the skill
25Since the initial and ￿nal steady states are predetemined, the intertemporal problem at hand depicts a Two-
Point Boundary Problem that is solved using a Generalized Fair Taylor Algorithm.
10premia. In addition, the replicated structure of the skill distribution fails to match the actual
development.26 Thus, we change the substitution and labor supply elasticities to improve our
model￿ s ￿t. The e⁄ects resulting from the change in the respective elasticities are reported in
columns Rep. 2 and Rep. 3 of Table 4.
To push the computed results in the direction of the actual pattern of the skill premium,
we increase the substitution elasticity between low-skilled labor and the capital-skill input, ￿L,
but reduce the one between capital and high-skilled labor, ￿H. Therewith, the complementarity
within the capital-skill input becomes even stronger, leading to an increase in high-skilled wages,
while low-skilled labor becomes even more easily substitutable, resulting in a decline of low-
skilled wages. As a consequence, the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 5th to 1st decile limit
of earnings increase.
In addition, an alteration in the labor supply elasticities is necessary to map the actual evolu-
tion in the German skill distribution. If we calibrate the degree of capital-skill complementarity
according to that estimated by Krussel et al. (2000), we require labor supply elasticities of the
values 0.6, 0.14, and 1.2 for low-, medium-, and high-skilled labor, respectively. A variation in
the labor supply elasticities, however, a⁄ects not only the supply of the di⁄erent labor skill type
and thereby the skill distribution of the labor force, but it additionally in￿ uences the respec-
tive wage rates and thereby the resulting skill premia. Hence, we search for a constellation of
substitution and labor supply elasticities by trial and error, which enables us to simultaneously
replicate the true pattern of the German skill premia and skill distribution of the labor force in
Germany.
One parameter constellation (column Rep. 4 in Table 4) that ￿ts the actual ￿gures quite
well implies substitution elasticities of ￿L = 2:1, ￿M = 1:33, ￿H = 0:51, and labor supply
elasticities in the range of "L = 0:89, "M = 0:25, "H = 0:8. As mentioned above, the values
for the substitution elasticities are largely in line with the estimates by Krussel et al. (2000)
or Lindquist (2005), if we regard low- and medium-skilled labor as one joint skill type as done
in their work. The labor supply elasticities also add up to an aggregate, economy-wide labor
supply elasticity of about 0.5, which is consistent with the value of 0.51 suggested by Feldstein
(2005) as an applicable value for macro models. This constellation of substitution and supply
elasticities serves as a benchmark for all future simulations conducted in the subsequent chapter.
Solution Strategy: The nature of the ￿rm￿ s and the household￿ s intertemporal problem is
characterized by a two-point boundary problem since the initial and ￿nal steady-state equilibria
are known.27 The phase of transition between these two equilibria is represented by a sequence
of temporary equilibria that are connected by a number of predetermined and forward-looking
variables. Since perfect foresight is assumed, the forward-looking variables represent a set of
expectations that re￿ ect the information inherent in the future equilibrium, i.e., ￿rm values
represent the present value of future dividend payments while human capital re￿ ects the present
value of future wages.28
For the solution to the two-point boundary problem we apply an iterative technique. Start-
26In particular, the model predicts the largest reduction for low-skilled labor supply, while in reality the supply
of medium-skilled labor was hit by the sharpest decline.
27Both, the initial and ￿nal steady-state equilibria are characterized by a speci￿c constellation of the behavioral
parameters determining technology and preferences according to the counterfactual analysis conducted.
28An additional issue relates to the uniqueness and stability of the computed equilibrium. Since the model￿ s
core consists of a neoclassical investment problem imbedded in a standard growth model that features a unique
and stable equilibrium, our model also ensures uniqueness and stability.
11ing with a ￿rst guess for the set of expectations that satisfy the ￿nal steady state, a sequence
of temporary equilibria is computed by solving the system of the model￿ s nonlinear di⁄erential
equations. During this ￿rst step of iteration, the computed vector of expected variables still
varies from the actual values prevailing in the temporary equilibria. Therefore, the set of ex-
pectations is updated according to the results obtained by the sequence of temporary equilibria.
The second iteration applies this updated set of expectations in order to compute a new sequence
of temporary equilibria, which again yields a set of revised expectations. The alignment and
updating of the set of expectations is carried out by a generalized Fair-Taylor algorithm that will
stop the iteration process if the discrepancy between the expected and actual variables resulting
from the sequence of temporary equilibria has become su¢ ciently small, i.e., e￿14.
3 Simulation Results
3.1 The Complementarity E⁄ect
Following the empirical implementation of our model outlined in the previous section, high-
skilled labor is the only production factor that constitutes a complement to capital while both
medium- and low-skilled labor are substitutes to capital. As a consequence of this structural
formulation, the accumulation of capital increases ￿rst and foremost the demand for high-skilled
labor and thereby the wage rate of the high-skilled. This explains the positive impact of capital
accumulation on the skill premium of the high-skilled in the presence of capital-skill complemen-
tarity. In quantitative terms, the German skill premium of the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings
rose by 12.2 percent during the last 15 years (from 1991 to 2005), while the ones de￿ned by the
9th to 5th and the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings rose by just 5.8 and 6.1 percent, respectively.
The ￿rst class of simulations is devoted to the Complementarity or Demand Side E⁄ect. This
implies that we quantify the impact resulting from a variation of the substitution elasticities on
the di⁄erent skill premia and on skill-speci￿c labor demand.
Table 5: The Complementarity E⁄ect
Actual Data Scenario 5.1 Scenario 5.2 Scenario 5.3
￿L=￿M=￿H 2.1 / 1.33 / 0.51 1.0 / 1.0 / 1.0 2.1 / 1.33 / 0.51 1.0 / 1.0 / 1.0
"L="M="H 0.89 / 0.25 / 0.8 0.89 / 0.25 / 0.8 0.51 / 0.51 / 0.51 0.51 / 0.51 / 0.51
￿ Skill Premia (in %)
D9/D1 12.2 0.48 16.5 -0.001
D9/D5 5.79 -4.33 12.8 -0.001
D5/D1 6.07 5.02 3.28 3.6 e￿13
￿ Skill Distribution (in %)
Low -0.7 3.04 -3.0 - / -
Medium -3.3 -1.90 -1.39 - / -
High 8.3 2.55 4.84 - / -
Source: Own calculations.
Starting from the model￿ s baseline calibration, which allows us to replicate the actual changes
in the German skill premia and the skill distribution of the German labor force, we perform a
counterfactual analysis and compute the counterfactual changes in the skill premia and the
12skill distribution resulting in a world with no capital-skill complementarity. In doing so, we set
all substitution elasticities equal to one (see Scenario 5.1), such that the variation in the skill
premia and skill distribution is solely driven by the actual skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities
prevailing in Germany. Interestingly, under uniform substitution elasticities, the accumulation
of capital during the 15-year period from 1991 to 2005 has almost no impact on the skill premium
of the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings. The latter increases by just 0.5 percent over the period
of 1991 to 2005. However, the actual pattern in German labor supply elasticities generates a
signi￿cant negative impact on the skill premium of the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings, which
in the absence of capital-skill complementarity declines by about 4.3 percent during the analyzed
period. By contrast, the skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings rises by more
than 5.0 percent.
If we compare the actual changes in the skill premia with those computed under the coun-
terfactual analysis (Scenario 5.1) we ￿nd that the feature of capital-skill complementarity has a
particularly enhancing impact on German skill premia. In the presence of capital-skill comple-
mentarity the increase in the skill premia de￿ned by the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit
of earnings turns out to be by about 11.7 and 10.1 percentage points larger (over the 15-year
period from 1991 to 2005) as compared with a world with no capital-skill complementarity.
To isolate the complementarity (demand side) e⁄ect from the quantity (supply side) e⁄ect,
that is, to eliminate the in￿ uence of the di⁄erentiated labor supply elasticities on the skill premia,
we apply identical supply elasticities of 0.51 for each labor skill type29 in Scenarios 5.2 and 5.3.
Given identical supply elasticities for each labor skill type, we once again quantify the variation
in the skill premia resulting under the presence and absence of capital-skill complementarity.
In the presence of capital-skill complementarity but uniform labor supply elasticities (see
Scenario 5.2), we ￿nd an even stronger spread between high-skilled and low- and medium-skilled
wages but a much smaller one between medium- and low-skilled wages as compared with the
actual German situation. Speci￿cally, the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile
limit of earnings increase by 16.5 and 12.8 percent, respectively, over the 15-year period from
1991 to 2005, while that of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings rises by just 3.3 percent.
In the absence of capital-skill complementarity and identical labor supply elasticities (see
Scenario 5.3), the accumulation of capital has an impact neither on the development of the skill
premia nor on the skill distribution. The zero variation in the skill premia and skill distribution
is explained by the uniform rise in skill-speci￿c wages30 and the uniform demand shift in favor
of each skill type. Comparing the results found under Scenarios 5.2 and 5.3, we ￿nd an even
stronger impact of capital-skill complementarity on the skill premia when we disregard the
quantity (supply side) e⁄ect.
To summarize, under uniform labor supply elasticities the feature of capital-skill comple-
mentarity boosts the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings by
about 16.5 and 12.8 percent, respectively, over the analyzed 15-year period from 1991 to 2005,
while the skill premia stay unchanged in a world of uniform labor supply elasticities and no
capital-skill complementarity. Accordingly, these ￿gures imply a yearly increase of 1.03 and 0.8
percent in the respective skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings
29A uniform labor supply elasticity of 0.51 seems to be appropriate for two reasons. First, the weighted average
of the applied skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities amounts to about 0.5. Second, Feldstein (2005) proposes a
value of 0.51 as an applicable estimate for the average compensated labor supply elasticity in macro models.
30In the absence of capital-skill complementarity and uniform labor supply elasticities of 0.51, the model com-
putes a uniform increase in skill-speci￿c wages of 12.8 percent over the 15-year period from 1991 to 2005.
13due to capital-skill complementarity. Since the applied substitution elasticities are broadly in
line with the ￿ndings for the United States and Sweden (see, for example, Krussel et al. 2000,
or Lindquist 2005), we claim that our estimates are also a rough approximation for the impact
of capital-skill complementarity on the skill premia in these countries.
In the next set of simulations we analyze how the skill premia and the skill distribution
change under an even stronger (or weaker) degree of capital-skill complementarity. In doing so,
we de￿ne a 1, 5, and 10 percent stronger (weaker) degree of capital-skill complementarity by a 1,
5, and 10 percent increase (decrease) in the substitution elasticities of those production factors
that are substitutes and an equally large decrease (increase) in the substitution elasticities of
those factors that are complements.31 Table 6 reports the ￿ndings of our second counterfactual
analysis. The numbers in brackets resemble percentage changes computed relative to the actual
variation in the German skill premia.
Table 6: The Complementarity E⁄ect Reconsidered
+ 10 % + 5 % + 1 % actual - 1 % - 5 % - 10 %
stronger CSC data weaker CSC























































































From a qualitative point of view all variations in the skill premia are in line with economic
theory: The particular case of a stronger (weaker) degree of capital-skill complementarity implies
that high-skilled labor becomes an even stronger (weaker) complement to capital, and thus any
accumulation of capital increases (decreases) the demand and therewith the wage rate of the
high-skilled. In addition, the degree of substitutability of low- and medium-skilled labor increases
(decreases) under an even stronger (weaker) degree of capital-skill complementarity, explaining
the observed rise (drop) in the skill premia de￿ned by the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile
limit of earnings.
In quantitative terms, a 1 percent stronger degree of capital-skill complementarity increases
the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decline limit of earnings by 1.7 and 4.2
31For instance, if we analyze the impact of a 5-percent stronger capital-skill complementarity, we increase the
respective substitution elasticity for low- and medium-skilled labor by 5 percent each, while we reduce that for
high-skilled labor also by 5 percent. In analyzing a weaker degree of capital-skill complementarity, the modi￿cation
in substitution elasticities is reverse.
14percent, respectively, while that of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings declines by almost 1
percent. Remember, all changes once again refer to the 15-year period from 1991 to 2005.
The di⁄erent magnitudes in the variation of the skill premia resulting from a 1 percent
stronger degree of capital-skill complementarity are explained by the changes in skill-speci￿c
labor demands as well as the di⁄erentiated skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities. First of all,
the increased spread in substitution elasticities leads to reduced demand for low- and medium-
skilled labor since both factors constitute substitutes with regard to the capital-skill input.32
The declining demand for low- and medium-skilled labor exerts a downward pressure on the
respective wage rates, which are particularly large for medium-skilled labor. The latter is the
case because medium-skilled labor faces a relatively inelastic supply ￿compared with low-skilled
labor ￿explaining the slight decline observed in the skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit
of earnings. Moreover, the increased demand for high-skilled labor raises the wage of the high-
skilled and hence explains the observed increase in the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th
to 5th decile limit of earnings.
For even stronger degrees of capital-skill complementarity, the variation in the skill premia
turns out to be almost proportional to the variation resulting from the 1-percent increase. The
same is also true of weaker degrees of capital-skill complementarity, i.e., the magnitude of the
changes in the skill premia under a weaker degree of capital-skill complementarity are almost
identical to the ones occurring under a stronger degree of the capital-skill complementarity, but
algebraic signs are of reverse order.
Our interim result regarding the complementarity e⁄ect states as follows: The complemen-
tarity or demand side e⁄ect has a substantial in￿ uence on the emerging skill premia. In case of
factor substitution elasticities in line with the ones found in the empirical literature and uniform
skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities, the feature of capital-skill complementarity raises the skill
premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings by more than 1.0 and 0.8
percent, respectively, on a yearly basis. That of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings rises by
more than 0.2 percent per year. In addition, we show that in Germany an increased spread
in substitution elasticities boosts in particular the skill premium of the 9th to 5th decile limit
of earnings while the impact on the skill premium of the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings is
relatively moderate. This di⁄erence is explained by the skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities,
i.e., the inelastic supply of medium-skilled labor.
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Complementarity E⁄ect
In the following sensitivity analysis we analyze the impact of a variation in each substitution
elasticity separately to get a more detailed insight into the quantitative importance of the com-
plementarity e⁄ect. In doing so, we start from our benchmark simulation (normal labor supply
elasticities) and increase each of the three substitution elasticities, ￿i, i 2 fL;M;Hg, by 1
32A 1-percent increase in the degree of capital skill complementarity reduces the demand for low-skilled labor
by more than 5.5 percent while the demand for medium-skilled labor decreases by only 1 percent over the 15-year
period from 1991 to 2005. The answer to this ￿nding refers on the one hand to the quite large substitution
elasticity between low-skilled labor and the intermediate input, but, on the other hand, low-skilled labor amounts
to less than 15 percent of the total working force such that a moderate absolute decline in the demand for low-
skilled workers results in a major relative change in low-skilled labor demand compared with a moderate absolute
decline in medium- or high-skilled labor. The latter two skill types amount to about 58 and 27 percent of the
total labor force, respectively. The variation in the skill distribution resulting under an even stronger or weaker
degree of capital-skill complementarity also turns out to be almost proportional to the 1-percent variation.
15percent.33 Our results are summarized in Table 7.
As a consequence of the 1-percent increase in the substitution elasticity for low-skilled labor
from 2.1 to 2.12 percent, low-skilled labor becomes less important in production, resulting in a
decline in the respective wage rate. In turn, the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 5th to 1st
decile limit of earnings increase. However, the 1-percent increase in the substitution elasticity of
low-skilled labor increases the two before-mentioned skill premia by less than 1 percent, while
the demand for low-skilled labor declines by about 4.8 percent. All results refer to the 15-year
period from 1991 to 2005.































￿ LL (in %) - 4.84 + 1.51 + 2.50
￿ LM (in %) + 0.17 - 0.42 + 0.61
￿ LH (in %) + 0.08 + 0.36 - 0.78
Applied Labor Supply Elasticities: ("L= 0:89;"M= 0:25;"H= 0:8).
Source: Own calculations.
A 1-percent increase in the substitution elasticity for medium-skilled labor has a major
impact on the skill premia of the 9th to 5th and the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings. The
former increases by 2.3 percent while the latter drops by almost 2 percent. These changes are
in line with the economic intuition resulting from a decline in the wage rate for medium-skilled
labor. The computed demand changes show that ￿rms require less medium-skilled labor (-0.42
percent) and employ more low-skilled labor (+1.5 percent) and a little more high-skilled labor
(+0.36 percent) instead.34
Lastly, a 1-percent change in the elasticity governing the substitutability of high-skilled labor
indicates a decline in each of the three skill premia. However, the decline in the skill premium
of the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings over the 15-year period is the most pronounced (-1.7
percent) followed by that of the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings (-0.9 percent).
3.3 The Relative Quantity E⁄ect
The second class of simulations focuses on the Quantity E⁄ect or Supply Side E⁄ect. This
e⁄ect speci￿es the impact of an alteration in skill-speci￿c labor supply on the skill premia and
skill distribution. From a theoretical point of view, the direction of the quantity e⁄ect, i.e. an
increase in skill-speci￿c labor supply, is straightforward: On a ceteris paribus basis, an isolated
33The sensitivity analysis in the form of a 1-percent variation in each substitution elasticity under inelastic
labor supply can be found in the Appendix.
34Since medium-skilled labor constitutes the largest fraction of labor in quantitative terms, the decline in
medium-skilled labor supply resulting from a 1-percent increase in the substitution elasticity of medium-skilled
labor appears to be relatively small.
16increase in the supply of high-skilled labor, for instance, causes a decline in high-skilled wages
and therewith results in an alleviating impact on the skill premia de￿ned by the 9th to 1st and
the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings. Following the same line of arguments, a reduction in the
supply of low- and medium-skilled labor raises the respective wage rates and has therewith also
an alleviating impact on the above-mentioned skill premia. The actual variation in the German
skill distribution over the analyzed period from 1991 to 2005 was marked by a similar pattern:
The supply of low- and medium-skilled labor declined by 0.72 and 0.33 percent, respectively,
while the supply of high-skilled labor increased by more than 8.2 percent. Accordingly, from a
theoretical point of view the constellation of skill-speci￿c labor supply must have had a clearly
negative impact on the German skill premia.
To isolate the quantity e⁄ect, we once again apply identical labor supply elasticities of 0.51
for each skill type (Scenario 8.1). If we compare the actual variation in the skill premia with the
one emerging under identical labor supply elasticities, we ￿nd that the skill premia de￿ned by the
9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings are signi￿cantly larger, while the one de￿ned
by the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings is much lower, compared with the changes observed in
the actual data. Accordingly, over the analyzed period from 1991 to 2005 the prevailing pattern
of skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities caused a reduction in the skill premia of the 9th to 1st
and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings by 4.3 and 7.0 percentage points, respectively. The
impact on the skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings amounted to an increase
by 2.8 percentage points.
Table 8: The Quantity E⁄ect
Actual Data Scenario 8.1 Scenario 8.2 Scenario 8.3 Scenario 8.4
￿L=￿M=￿H 2.1 / 1.33 / 0.51 2.1 / 1.33 / 0.51 2.1 / 1.33 / 0.51 1.0 / 1.0 / 1.0 1.0 / 1.0 / 1.0
"L="M="H 0.89 / 0.25 / 0.8 0.51 / 0.51 / 0.51 0.01 / 0.01 / 0.01 0.28 / 0.671 / 0.09 0.41 / 0.18 / 2.86
￿ Skill Premia (in %)
D9/D1 12.2 16.5 36.2 12.22 -8.27
D9/D5 5.8 12.8 30.2 5.80 -10.67
D5/D1 6.1 3.28 4.56 6.06 2.69
￿ Skill Distribution (in %)
Low -0.7 -3.0 -0.11 6.87 -0.72
Medium -3.3 -1.39 -0.07 0.76 -3.32
High 8.3 4.84 0.20 -4.78 8.24
Source: Own calculations.
On a yearly basis, the alleviating impact resulting from the di⁄erentiated skill-speci￿c labor
supply elasticities amounts to -0.28 and -0.45 percent for the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the
9th to 5th decile limit of earnings, respectively, and to 0.18 percent for the skill premium de￿ned
by the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings. Stated di⁄erently, the constellation of skill-speci￿c
labor supply elasticities prevailing in Germany induces a yearly decline in the skill premia of the
9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings by almost 0.3 and 0.45 percent, respectively.
The skill premium de￿ned by the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings increases by 0.18 percent per
year due to the speci￿c constellation of supply elasticities.
Under Scenario 8.2 we analyze the change in skill premia resulting under capital-skill comple-
mentarity but inelastic labor supply. Under this scenario, the constellation of factor substitution
17elasticities implies that the increase in the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile
limit of earnings over the period from 1991 to 2005 is almost three and ￿ve times larger, respec-
tively, compared with the actual changes in skill premia.
If we take Scenario 8.1 with uniform labor supply elasticities as a benchmark, the impact of
switching from elastic to inelastic labor supply is less dramatic. Comparing Scenarios 8.1 and
8.2, the resulting skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings is by
￿just￿2.2 and 2.4 times larger, respectively, under inelastic labor supply compared with elastic
labor supply.35
In Scenarios 8.3 and 8.4 we once again perform a counterfactual analysis and search of
the ￿right￿skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities that generate the actual pattern observed in
the German skill premia (Scenario 8.3) and the German skill distribution (Scenario 8.4) in the
absence of capital-skill complementarity. To replicate the actual pattern in German skill premia
in the absence of capital-skill complementarity, a reverse pattern in skill-speci￿c labor supply
elasticities is required. Speci￿cally, the supply of low- and high-skilled labor needs to be quite
inelastic (supply elasticities of 0.28 and 0.09, respectively) while medium-skilled labor has to
feature the largest supply elasticity of 0.67.
The next set of simulations is dedicated to the impact of even stronger (or weaker) skill-
speci￿c labor supply elasticities. We raise (reduce) each of the labor supply elasticities by 1, 5,
and 10 percent, and quantify the impact on the skill premia and the skill distribution. Table 9
reports our ￿ndings.
Table 9: The Quantity E⁄ect Reconsidered
+ 10 % + 5 % + 1 % actual - 1 % - 5 % - 10 %
stronger Labor Supply data weaker Labor Supply























































































An equal relative increase in skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities reduces the skill premia of
the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings but has a very small positive impact on
35Furthermore, we infer from Table 8 that the change in the skill distribution of the population is obviously
more pronounced the larger the applied labor supply elasticities are. In case we assume a common labor supply
elasticity of 0.51, the share of high-skilled workers increases by almost 5 percent, while the share of medium- and
low-skilled workers declines by 1.4 and 3 percent, respectively.
18the skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings. The algebraic signs of the variations
are explained as follows: First of all, an increase in the labor supply elasticities leads to a
major or minor reduction in skill-speci￿c wages, depending on the initially prevailing supply
elasticities. Reliant on the new wage structure, ￿rms reshu› e the labor skill types employed.
To state it more precisely, medium-skilled labor faces the lowest supply elasticity and therefore
the 1-percent increase in the corresponding supply elasticity leads to an only minor quantity
reaction in the supply of medium-skilled labor. Accordingly, the downward pressure exerted on
medium-skilled wages remains relatively small. Contrary to that, low- and high-skilled labor are
both marked by relatively high supply elasticities, such that both skill types face a major drop
in their wage rates due to the 1-percent increase in the supply elasticities. As a consequence,
￿rms substitute medium-skilled labor (-0.44 per cent) with low- and high-skilled labor (+0.76
and +0.32 percent, respectively). Moreover, in equilibrium the relatively stronger demand for
low-skilled labor countervails the decline in low-skilled wages. These patterns explain the slight
reduction in the skill premium of the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings, the relatively large drop
observed for the skill premium of the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings, and the tiny increase in
the skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings.
Next, if we compare the impact of a 1-percent variation in the substitution elasticities (see
Table 6) or labor supply elasticities (see Table 9) on the skill premia, we ￿nd a much larger
impulse resulting from the variation in substitution elasticities compared with an equally large
variation in supply elasticities. On average the complementarity e⁄ect has about a 2.5 times
larger impact on the skill premia compared with the impact of the quantity e⁄ect.
As discussed at the beginning of this section, it is not only the spread within the skill-speci￿c
labor supply elasticities that matters; the absolute size of the applied labor supply elasticities
also plays a crucial role in the evolution of the skill premia. In general, the larger the applied
(uniform) labor supply elasticities, the less pronounced the yearly increase in the skill premia
due to the complementarity e⁄ect. This ￿nding becomes obvious by the ￿gures presented in
Table 10.
Table 10: Yearly Impact of CSC under di⁄erent Labor Supply Elasticities
"i = 0.01 0.26 0.51 0.76 1.01 1.26 1.51 1.76 2.01 2.26 2.51 2.76 3.01
￿ Skill Premia (in %)
￿ D9/D1 2.08 1.40 1.02 0.79 0.63 0.51 0.43 0.36 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.19
￿ D9/D5 1.78 1.14 0.80 0.60 0.47 0.38 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13
￿ D5/D1 0.30 0.25 0.2 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06
Source: Own calculations.
In the case of almost inelastic labor supply elasticities, the applied constellation of factor
substitution elasticities36 leads to a yearly increase in the skill premia de￿ned by the 9th to 1st
and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings of 2.1 and 1.8 percent, respectively. However, a steady
increase in labor supply elasticities reduces the positive impact of capital-skill complementarity
on the skill premia. In case of labor supply elasticities of around one, the augmenting in￿ uence
of capital-skill complementarity on the skill premia has declined to a yearly impact of just 0.63
and 0.47 percent, respectively, for the above-mentioned skill premia.
36In the presence of capital-skill complementarity, the applied factor substitution elasticity between capital and
high-skilled labor is set at 0.51, that between the capital-skill input and medium-skilled labor is set at 1.33, and
￿nally that between the intermediate input and low-skilled labor is set at 2.1.
19To summarize, our interim results regarding the quantity e⁄ect state: The relatively high
supply elasticities of low- and high-skilled labor in Germany had a quite strong alleviating impact
on the German skill premia. Without these di⁄erentiated skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities,
the increase in the German skill premium de￿ned by the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings would
have been larger by about one third, while the one de￿ned by the 9th to 5th decile limit of
earnings would have been more than twice as large. Both changes refer to the analyzed period
from 1991 to 2005. Accordingly, we ￿nd clear evidence that the quantity e⁄ect has countervailed
the complementarity e⁄ect in the German case and that the quantity e⁄ect had a signi￿cant
alleviating impact on the German skill premia.
Second, under inelastic labor supply the impact of capital-skill complementarity on the skill
premia is enormous. The increase in the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th
decile limit of earnings becomes almost three and ￿ve times larger, respectively, compared with
the actual change in the skill premia. A steady increase in labor supply elasticities, however,
counteracts the positive impact of capital-skill complementarity such that the increase in skill
premia becomes less pronounced.
Third, in absolute terms, the in￿ uence of the quantity e⁄ect on the skill premia is much
weaker (about 2.5 times smaller) compared with that of the complementarity e⁄ect.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Quantity E⁄ect
Finally, our last simulation comprises a sensitivity analysis with regard to the labor supply
elasticities. We quantify the e⁄ect of a separate 1-percent increase in each labor supply elasticity.
Our results are presented in Table 11.
Table 11: Sensitivity Analysis with regard to the Labor Supply Elasticities
Capital-Skill Complementarity
(￿L = 2.1; ￿M = 1.33; ￿H = 0.51)
No Capital-Skill Complementarity























































￿ LL -0.68 -0.73 -0.73 3.08 3.02 3.03
￿ LM -3.33 -3.31 -3.34 -1.90 1.88 -1.91
￿ LH 8.23 8.22 8.29 2.54 2.53 2.58
Under CSC: ￿ in D9/D1, D9/D5, D5/D1: 12.2, 5.79, 6.07; ￿ in LL;LM;LH: -0.72, -3.32, 8.24
No CSC: ￿ in D9/D1, D9/D5, D5/D1: 0.48, -4.33, 5.02; ￿ in LL;LM;LH: 3.04, -1.90, 2.55
Source: Own calculations.
In the presence of capital-skill complementarity, a 1-percent increase in the labor supply
elasticity of low-skilled labor has a small positive impact on the skill premia de￿ned by the 9th
to 1st and the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings. The latter increases by 0.3 and 0.35 percent,
respectively. The rationale for the observed variation in skill premia is based on the increased
20abundance of low-skilled labor (as a consequence of the larger supply elasticity), which exerts
some downward pressure on the wage rate of the low-skilled.
A 1-percent increase in the labor supply elasticity of medium-skilled labor results in an
increase by 0.36 percent in the skill premium of the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings while that
of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings falls by 0.3 percent. These variations in skill premia are
straightforward e⁄ects resulting from an increased supply and therewith a lower wage rate of
the medium-skilled.
Finally, a 1-percent increase in the labor supply elasticity of high-skilled labor reduces both
the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings. The former declines
by about 0.8 percent and the latter by almost 2 percent. The explanation for this ￿nding is
obvious and follows the above-mentioned lines of arguments.
In case we disregard capital-skill complementarity (right part of Table 11), a marginal change
in labor supply elasticities has a much more pronounced impact throughout. This is particularly
true for the skill premium de￿ned by the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings. All variations in the
sensitivity analysis also refer to the 15-year period from 1991 to 2005.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the quantitative importance of capital-skill complementarity and
endogenous skill-speci￿c labor supply for wage inequality in Germany. Our simulation results are
derived using a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model in the spirit of Auerbach-
Kotliko⁄ (1987). The methodological contribution of our dynamic CGE model refers to the
three-level constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function using capital, and low-,
medium-, and high-skilled labor as input factors as well as to the endogenous labor supply of each
skill category. The modeling approach enables us to provide a detailed quantitative analysis on
the isolated e⁄ects of capital-skill complementarity and di⁄erentiated skill-speci￿c labor supply
elasticities on the emerging skill premia as de￿ned by the 9th to 1st, the 9th to 5th, and the 5th
to 1st decile limit of earnings. In particular, the endogenous supply of the di⁄erent labor skill
categories allows us to separate the in￿ uence of capital-skill complementarity from the quantity
e⁄ect, i.e., the impact resulting from the di⁄erentiated skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities
on the various skill premia. This feature constitutes the major contribution of our study in
addition to the detailed analysis in the evolution of skill premia, since nearly all existing papers
in the literature just distinguish between low- and high-skilled labor (for instance, see Bound
and Johnson 1992, Du⁄y et al. 2003, Goldin and Katz 1998, Krussel et al. 2000, Lindquist 2005,
Papageorgiou and Chmelarova 2005, or Topel 1997).37
The simulation results con￿rm our conjecture that the complementarity or demand side e⁄ect
has a particularly strong positive impact on the skill premia of the high-skilled while the quantity
or supply side e⁄ect counteracts the complementarity e⁄ect and exerts a downward pressure on
the skill premium of the high-skilled. Speci￿cally, the demand side e⁄ect, i.e. capital-skill
complementarity as con￿rmed in the empirical literature,38 has a quite substantial in￿ uence and
raises the skill premium of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings by more than
37The distinction among low-, medium-, and high-skilled labor is of particular importance when analyzing wage
inequality in Germany, because low- and high-skilled labor cover only 15 and 27 percent, respectively, of the total
German labor force.
38See Krussel et al. (2000) or Lindquist (2005), for instance.
211.0 and 0.8 percent per year, respectively. The impact on the skill premium of the 5th to 1st
decile limit of earnings amounts to 0.22 percent per year
Regarding the quantity or supply side e⁄ect, we ￿nd clear evidence that the prevailing
constellation of skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities in Germany has a quite strong alleviating
impact on the skill premia of the German high-skilled. In a world with non-di⁄erentiated labor
supply elasticities, the skill premium of the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings would have been
larger by about one third while that of the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings would have been
more than twice as large. On a yearly basis, the alleviating impact that emanates from the
di⁄erentiated skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities amounts to almost 0.3 and 0.45 percent for
the skill premia de￿ned by the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings, respectively.
Contrary to that, the skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings increases by 0.18
percent per year due to the prevailing constellation of skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticities.
Moreover, we ￿nd that the less elastic the labor supply elasticities are, the larger is the
impact of capital-skill complementarity on skill premia. For the case of inelastic labor supply,
our model computes an increase in the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the 9th to 5th decile
limit of earnings that are almost three and ￿ve times larger, respectively, over the 15-year period
from 1999 to 2005 as compared with the actual values.39 Finally we state that even though both
the complementarity and the quantity e⁄ects are antagonists, the complementarity e⁄ect has a
much stronger (about 2.5 times larger) impact on the skill premia compared with the quantity
e⁄ect.
An interesting question for further research relates to the in￿ uence of personal income taxes
on individual labor supply and therewith on the quantity e⁄ect. In the presence of a progressive
personal income tax system as it exists in almost all industrialized countries, the major tax
burden levied on the high-skilled ought to have a strong (negative) impact on the labor supply
decision of this particular skill group. Therefore, a plausible conjecture still to be approved
claims that a progressive personal income tax system might have an alleviating impact on the
observed quantity e⁄ect and hence enforces a further divergence in skill-speci￿c wage rates, as
already attested to in case of capital-skill complementarity.
5 Appendix
If we set each skill-speci￿c labor supply elasticity close to zero and redo our sensitivity analysis
carried out in section 3.2, we ￿nd that the changes in the skill premia of the 9th to 1st and the
9th to 5th decile limit of earnings are about three and ￿ve times larger, respectively, compared
with the actual changes occurring under ￿normal￿labor supply (see also the results presented
in Table 8). However, an isolated 1-percent variation in one of the substitution elasticities ￿i,
i 2 fL;M;Hg has not necessarily a larger impact on the percentage change of the respective
skill premia compared with the results derived under ￿normal￿labor supply.
39Under inelastic labor supply, an isolated increase in one of the substitution elasticities does not, however,
necessarily lead to a larger variation in the skill premia as compared with elastic labor supply. Thus, the magnitude
of the labor supply elasticities a⁄ects just the absolute size of the increase in the skill premia, but not the impact
resulting from a (marginal) variation in behavioral elasticities (see also Table A1 in the Appendix).



























































Variation in skill premia, D9/D1, D9/D5, D5/D1 under actual labor supply: 12.2, 5.8, 6.1.
Variation in skill premia, D9/D1, D9/D5, D5/D1 under inelastic labor supply: 36.2, 30.2, 4.56.
Source: Own calculations.
For instance, under inelastic labor supply a 1-percent increase in the elasticity of substitution
of low-skilled labor raises the skill premium of the 9th to 1st decile limit of earnings by less than
0.3 percent over the period from 1991 to 2005, whereas in the case of normal labor supply the
variation in this skill premium amounts to more than 0.4 percent. However, the increase in
the skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings amounts to almost 1.8 percent under
inelastic labor supply while it amounts to just 0.8 percent in the case of elastic labor supply.
Furthermore, under inelastic labor supply, a 1-percent increase in the elasticity of substitution
for medium-skilled labor raises the skill premium of the 9th to 5th decile limit of earnings by
just 0.7 percent, while its increase amounts to 2.3 percent when actual labor supply elasticities
are applied. The reverse is true for the skill premium of the 5th to 1st decile limit of earnings:
it diminishes by almost 2.8 percent under inelastic labor supply but by only 1.9 percent under
elastic labor supply.
Only the variation in the substitution elasticity of high-skilled labor results in a strictly
larger increase of the skill premia under inelastic labor supply.
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